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Summary: By defining three targets as pillars of their environmental
policy (20% cleaning, 20% greening and 20% saving energy by 2020), Euro-
pean authorities are putting out noisy signals on what the actual objective
is and how to achieve it. I show that, whereas the Community-wide CO2
market (named Emissions Trading System, ETS) is one of the right answers
to fix greenhouse-gas emissions, the policy tools implemented by Member
States to achieve the greening and saving objectives reduce the efficiency of
ETS and push the CO2 price down. I then analyze the efficiency distortions
created by the forced entry of Renewable Energy Sources into the mix of
electricity production.
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1 Introduction
Starting with “Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the
internal market in electricity”, the European authorities decided that the
electricity industry should join telecoms and similar network activities in the
competition adventure. Transmission and distribution infrastructure was
∗I thank the participants of the 2013 Cresse conference for their comments, and Yossi
Spiegel for his attentive reading of the first draft. All remaining errors and omissions are
my own.
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recognized as a natural monopoly, and therefore excluded from the field.
By contrast, production and supply to final customers have progressively
been opened to competitive mechanisms under the scrutiny of national and
community competition authorities. Producers and suppliers can now freely
enter and exit the market, as cheap and high-quality firms are allowed to
supplant badly performing ones.
Incumbents have however fiercely (and successfully) resisted this open-
ing process, often with the help of Member State governments which like
the concept of national champions, particularly on the energy battlefield
where independence and security of supply are viewed as strategic. There
is another reason why the liberalization process is far from successful in the
EU electricity industry. Global warming has progressively become a central
concern in energy policy1 and the tools forged by the European Commu-
nity to tackle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been wrongly designed,
resulting in State aid becomingt the rule rather than the exception. State
aid should be granted only under specific circumstances because it distorts
competition mechanisms, frequently on purpose. With the surge of environ-
mental concerns, State aid is everywhere in the energy sector. Not only does
it distort market mechanisms, it is also inefficiently adapted to the aim it is
supposed to pursue. For example, according to Marcantonini and Ellerman
(2013, p.20), in Germany "the CO2 abatement cost of wind for 2006-2010
is on average €43/tCO2, higher than the historical EU ETS carbon price
but of the same order of magnitude. On the contrary, the CO2 abatement
cost of solar is very high, the average for 2006-2010 is €537/tCO2, much
above any possible realistic carbon price." (Recall that during the year 2013
the carbon price has fluctuated between €3 and €5/tCO2.) In this paper I
identify the mistakes that have led to the current costly framework and pro-
pose arguments in favor of dismantling the system of subsidies to Renewable
Energy Sources of electricity.
In Section 2, I explain the discrepancy between what the policy to re-
duce CO2 emissions should be and how it is implemented by the European
authorities. In particular, I show that the European Trading System, the
1See OECD (2006).
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flagship of the EU environmental policy, is endangered by complementary
policies fixing targets for renewables and energy saving. In Section 3, I
discuss the distortions created by State aid aimed at promoting renewable
sources of energy in the technology mix, and in section 4 I present some
brief concluding remarks.
2 Inefficient environmental regulation
In 2005, following the Kyoto protocol (1997) which had the objective to
slow down global warming, the European Union launched the Emissions
Trading System (ETS), a cap-and-trade mechanism dedicated to limiting
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.2 This initiative, justified on economic
grounds, was unfortunately complemented later by mandatory targets in
terms of renewable energy sources (RES) and consumption reduction that
impair the efficiency of ETS and increase the cost of reaching the GHG
target.
2.1 One objective, three directives
The environmental policy of the European Union is currently driven by three
directives:
• Directive 2009/29/EC to achieve at least a 20% reduction in GHG by
2020 compared to 1990,
• Directive 2009/28/EC to reach a 20% share of RES in overall EU
energy consumption by 2020,3
• Directive 2012/27/EU to save 20% of the EU’s energy consumption
compared to projections for 2020.
2Directive 2003/87/CE.
3The list of RES is fixed: production of energy from wind, solar, aerothermal, geother-
mal, hydrothermal and ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment
plant gas and biogases.
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Such profusion of regulation raises many questions, in particular: Why
do we need three objectives (and directives)? Are these objectives mutu-
ally consistent? Are they consistent with EU competition policy, with EU
industrial policy, and with EU tax policy?
Let us first look at the problem starting from the following situation
focused on the electricity industry :
• the surplus derived from electricity consumption q is S (q), an increas-
ing and concave function;
• two production technologies have been installed: one serves to produce
quantity x at marginal cost cx, the second to produce y at marginal
cost cy, where cx < cy.
This very simple situation is not uncommon in national electricity in-
dustries, with x standing for electricity from coal-fired plants and y for
electricity from an additional primary energy, natural gas for example.4
Assume that the installed capacity to produce x, labelledKx, is such that
S
′−1 (cx) < Kx. The optimal dispatch is the triplet (x, y, q) that maximizes
the net social surplus, that is
max
x,y,q
S (q)− cxx− cyy s.t. q ≤ x+ y, x ≤ Kx, y ≤ Ky (1)
The social planner will then choose
qo = xo = arg

S
′
(x) = cx

< Kx, y
o = 0 (2)
This allocation can be implemented by a price for electricity po = cx.
Assume now that scientists prove that x is emitting pollutants e (x),
which is an increasing function. This generates an environmental cost c (e) ,
which is increasing and convex. By contrast technology y emits few pollu-
4See International Energy Agency (2012), “Key World Energy Statistics”, page 24,
www.iea.org
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tants, normalized to 0. To simplify, also assume that
arg

cx + c
′
(e (x)) e
′
(x) = cy

< S
′−1 (cy) (3)
which means that the marginal cost of y intersects with the marginal so-
cial cost of technology x (including the environmental damage) before it
intersects with the marginal surplus curve.
Given these new elements, the social planner must solve
max
x,y,q
S (q)− cxx− c (e (x))− cyy s.t. q ≤ x+ y, x ≤ Kx, y ≤ Ky (4)
The solution is the environmentally friendly dispatch
x∗ = arg

cx + c
′
(e (x)) e
′
(x) = cy

, q∗ = S
′
−1 (cy) , y
∗ = q∗ − x∗ (5)
The upper panel in Figure 1 shows the marginal cost of electricity (i) with
the environmental damage (bold piecewise linear curve) and (ii) without the
environmental damage (dotted staircase curve), and the decreasing marginal
gross surplus S
′
(q). The right lower panel shows the polluting emissions;
they increase with the production from technology x up to capacity Kx, and
then become constant given our hypothesis that y does not emit pollutants.
In the left lower panel, we have drawn the environmental cost of pollutants.
As illustratedby arrows in Figure 1, there are three differences between
the short-sighted dispatch (2) and the environmental-friendly dispatch (5):
• the non polluting technology partially replaces the polluting one: y∗ >
yo = 0, x∗ < xo = qo
• polluting emissions are decreased: e (x∗) < e (xo)
• total consumption is decreased: q∗ = x∗ + y∗ < qo.
Now THE question is: how to implement the virtuous dispatch x∗, y∗, q∗?
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Figure 1: Myopic vs. virtuous dispatch
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The economist’s answer is very simple: environmental damages are ex-
ternalities that can be curbed either by a price (Pigou, 1920) or by the allo-
cation of rights to pollute (Coase, 1960). We know since Weitzman (1974)
that these two tools are not strictly equivalent,5 but at least they oblige pol-
luters to internalize the cost of their private decisions.6 In our illustration,
since the marginal environmental damage is c
′
(e (x)) e
′
(x) = cy − cx at the
optimum, given the piecewise linear shape of the electricity marginal cost,
the tax charged to x’s operators should be t− < cy− cx for each kWh below
x∗ and t+ > cy − cx for each kWh above x
∗. The alternative is to give for
free or to sell producers the right to emit the quantity e (x∗) .
2.2 The CO2 market and its toxic companions
The solution adopted by European authorities to reduce CO2 emissions is
the European Trading System (ETS), launched in 2005. It is a cap-and-trade
system where a mandatory target has been imposed on almost 12,000 in-
dustrial plants throughout Europe, plus the airlines companies since 2012.7
They are the obligated parties. For each obligated firm, the adjustment
between the individual target and the initial endowment is reached par-
tially thanks to technical investment to abate polluting emissions, partially
through trade. The market part of the mechanism generates a carbon price.
Per se, it is a good solution:
• it is the market alternative to the Pigovian tax, necessary to fix a
negative externality; it is efficient when well designed;
5 In our example they are equivalent because there is no randomness in either preferences
or costs. See also Hepburn (2006).
6The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) is established by article 191 of the "Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union". In fact, a large share of the additional cost is passed
through to the consumers who are the ultimate polluters (see Fabra and Reguant, 2013).
7 In April 2013, the EU decided to temporarily suspend requirements for flights from
or to non-European countries. The legislation continues to apply to flights within and
between countries in Europe. The International Civil Aviation Organization was expected
to reach a global agreement to tackle aviation emissions in line with the EU-ETS during
its autumn meeting. It reached consensus on October 3 2013 for a roadmap to create a
market-based scheme curbing aviation emissions by 2020, but rejected the EU proposal
allowing it to apply its ETS to foreign airlines in the interim.
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• it sends a scarcity signal to polluters;
• it allows firms to adjust the volumes they need;8
• it generates public revenues.9
With the CO2 emissions from EU industrial plants under control, one
would expect the European authorities to be satisfied. In reality they are
not. First they are dissatisfied because the quantity controlled is only a small
fraction of worldwide emissions, and the EU effort opens the door to free-
riding by non-EU countries. The second reason is more surprising. Dissatis-
faction comes from the price of the CO2 ton (formerly in secondary markets,
now at the initial auctions). So far the tCO2 price has remained rather low,
around €3 during the first semester of 2013, well below the penalty for non-
compliance (€40/tCO2 during the first round 2005-2007, €100/tCO2 during
the second 2008-2012 and the third 2013-2020). The authorities have ap-
parently forgotten why ETS was created, and have made fund-raising their
main concern because they want to feed high public expenditures and sub-
sidize non-profitable clean energy sources and energy efficiency programs.
This is why during spring 2013 the Commission proposed a “backloading”
of allowances, which meant postponing a series of carbon permit auctions,
in the hope that provisional scarcity would push the price up. The Euro-
pean Parliament rejected the proposal on April 16 but finally accepted it on
July 3. Hence the allocations of some 2014 permits by Member States to
their industries will be held back from auction until 2019. This confusion
between objectives and tools is counterproductive not only for the control
of CO2 emissions, but also for the tax-collecting objective politicians have
in mind, as we explain below.
The initial mistake comes from the alignment of the three effects identi-
fied in Figure 1. This is an error because with a clear policy to limit GHG
8See OECD (2011).
9Since January 2013, we have entered Phase III where all electricity producers must
buy the rights to emit CO2 instead of receiving them for free on a grandfathering basis
like in Phases I and II. Overall, 40% of allowances are to be auctioned. On the auctioning
rules, see European Commission (2010).
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emissions, there is no need to subsidize less polluting technologies and to
limit consumption: as we have seen, y∗ > yo and q∗ < qo are natural con-
sequences of the carbon policy. Independent quantitative targets for 20%
energy saving and 20% of renewables in the energy mix are inefficient solu-
tions because
• they are viewed as genuine objectives whereas they do not directly fix
an externality;
• they require large amounts of red tape and State aid;
• they increase the cost of reaching the CO2 target;
• they introduce noise into the CO2 price and public revenues from al-
lowances auctions.
The latter two points can be explained as follows. Let za stand for the
direct abatement effort of polluting firms at unit cost wa (e.g. switching
from coal to natural gas, carbon storage), zb the effort to comply with addi-
tional rules at unit cost wb (i.e. adopt renewable sources or decrease energy
consumption), and g (za, zb) the resulting decrease in CO2 emissions. The
optimal combination of efforts is the solution to
min
za,zb
waza +wbzb s.t. g (za, zb) ≥ T (6)
where the target is T = 20% of 1990 emissions. The solution is z∗a =
za (wa, wb, T ) , z
∗
b = zb (wa, wb, T ) defined by g (za, zb) = T and
∂g(za,zb)/∂za
∂g(za,zb)/∂zb
=
wa
wb
and the cost of this optimal policy is C∗ (T ) = waz
∗
a +wbz
∗
b .
As the authorities impose the additional constraint zb ≥ zb, we have two
possibilities:
i) either zb ≤ zb (wa, wb, T ): the new constraint is redundant since it is
met by the solution to (6). In that case, all the subsidies allocated to meet
the additional constraint are pure windfall gains for beneficiaries;
ii) or zb > zb (wa, wb, T ): the least—cost solution is no longer feasible.
The constrained solution is zoa = arg [g (za, zb) = T ] , z
o
b = zb. As we can see
9
least-cost 
solution
constrained 
solution
Figure 2: Cost minimization to reach the CO2 target.
in Figure 2, there are two important consequences: (a) the solution is more
costly than it should be, wazoa + wbz
o
b > C
∗ (T ) because of the additional
constraint(s) represented by the secondary target(s) and (b) since zob > z
∗
b ,
the direct effort to abate CO2 emissions is reduced: zoa < z
∗
a.
It is important to insist on the second effect (zoa < z
∗
a) because it illus-
trates how bad policy can impair good economic tools. On the CO2 market,
supply is basically fixed and equal to the European Union Allowances deter-
mined for each year of the current Phase by the EU authorities.10 Demand
is derived from profit maximization by industrial polluters. As in the case of
any input, the demand for allowances decreases in line with the price of al-
lowances and of complementary inputs (for example coal), and increases with
10There also exist credits from complementary programs: Emissions Reducing Units
(from Joint Implementation) and Certified Emission Reduction (from Clean Development
Mechanism), that introduce some price-elasticity in supply; see cdm.unfccc.int/about and
ji.unfccc.int.
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the price of substitutes (for example abatement technologies) and that of all
the output drivers (for example global activity, electricity price, etc.). De-
creasing the need for abatement effort automatically decreases the cost of the
related technologies, which depresses the allowance requirement since abate-
ment effort and emission credits are close substitutes. In a price-quantity
diagram it is then easy to understand that because of the secondary targets,
the demand for permits is shifted leftwards, resulting in a price decrease.
In a nutshell, the tighter the green constraint (20% of renewables) and the
white constraint (20% of energy saving), the lower the price of CO2 on the
ETS. This negative side-effect is apparently a bad surprise for governments
in needs of tax revenues. The fact that emissions are kept under control has
become a secondary concern.
3 The promotion of renewables
Regarding direct CO2 abatement, EU Member States have no choice: ETS
is mandatory. By contrast, they remain free to organize as they see fit the
path towards 20% renewables and 20% energy saving. This explains the
wide variety of regulations and State aid used by various countries to reach
the targets.11 In the EU competition policy toolbox, the control of State
aid plays an important role in limiting potential distortions that govern-
ments could create when they sustain domestic agents by financial and non-
financial means. The principle settled by Article 107 of the Treaty is simple:
“State aid is forbidden, except if”. Aid in favor of environment protection
is one of the categories exempted from notification requirements.12 In other
words, when it comes to the 20-20-20 objective, the principle changes to:
“State aid is permitted, except if”.
In the following paragraphs, I limit the analysis to the "Green 20” strat-
egy, that is to the promotion of Renewable Energy Sources. I discuss the
current EU environment policy in favor of RES in two steps: (i) RES have
several handicaps that impede their efficient entry into the energy mix; and
11See Butler and Neuhoff (2008) and Ragwitz et al. (2012)
12The others are aid in favor of small enterprises, R&D, employment, and training.
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(ii) the various tools used to promote RES, in particular Feed-in Tariffs
(FIT), have severe distortive effects.
3.1 Efficient energy mix
3.1.1 Technology choice without RES
The basic model for electricity producers burning coal or natural gas is as
follows: to produce quantity qft at date t it costs cf per unit below the
equipment capacity Kf . Consequently the optimal equipment to install and
quantities to produce given the increasing and concave surplus functions
St (.) are the solution to
max
Kf ,{qft}
− rfKf +
Nf
t=1
St (qft)− cfqft
(1 + ρ)t
s.t. qft ≤ Kf ∀t (7)
where Nf is the (exogenously given) life of the equipment, rf the unit cost
of capacity, and ρ the interest rate.
From the first order conditions, we obtain
q∗ft =

arg

S
′
t (qft) = cf

< K∗f if S
′
t

K∗f

< cf
K∗f otherwise
(8)
and K∗f = arg

t∈N∗
f
S
′
t (Kf )− cf
(1 + ρ)t
= rf
 (9)
where N∗f is the subset of periods where the equipment is saturated, i.e.
q∗ft = K
∗
f . In addition to the local conditions (8) and (9), we must check
whether the overall discounted net surplus is non-negative at the solution:
− rfK
∗
f +
Nf
t=1
St

q∗ft

− cfq
∗
ft
(1 + ρ)t
≥ 0 (10)
Otherwise, K∗f = 0 and q
∗
ft = 0 at all t.
Under perfect competition, the expected profit of producers is −rfKf +
12
Nf
t=1
(pet−cf)qft
(1+ρ)t
where pet (Kf , cf ) = max

S
′
t (Kf ) , cf

is the equilibrium elec-
tricity spot price at t given Kf .
The non-negativity of discounted cash-flow imposes

t∈N∗
f
S
′
t (Kf )− cf
(1 + ρ)t
≥ rf (11)
If all firms have the same technology, free entry transforms (11) into an
equality by decreasing pet (Kf , cf ) = S
′
t (Kf ). It determines the equilibrium
capacity to install, equal to the optimal one K∗f . By the free entry process,
firms balance their budget at the long run competitive equilibrium.
If technologies are heterogeneous, there are more than two types of mar-
ket state to determine the spot price. It remains true that at off-peak
periods, the price is equal to the operating cost of the cheapest technology
and at peak periods it is equal to the marginal utility of the whole capac-
ity. In between (low and medium demand) the price is determined by the
operating cost of intermediate technologies. The peaking firms (those with
a large cf ) are called into operation only for a very small number of peak
hours N∗f . They can therefore survive only if they have a low capital cost rf
and prices pet = S
′
t

f
Kf

are sufficiently high during the N∗f periods.
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Again, at the long run competitive equilibrium, all the active firms balance
their budget.14
3.1.2 Technology choice with RES
How does this mechanism change when electricity from RES is available?
Most of the technologies based on RES have two characteristics: (i) they can
work only if a non-controllable source of primary energy is available (wind,
water along the river, solar energy) and (ii) the operating cost is nil when
13Actually, prices are capped in most wholesale markets: for example €3000/MWh on
EPEXspot. The cap creates a "missing money" problem that some countries solve by
capacity payments, capacity obligations, or capacity markets.
14The first proof was published in Boîteux (1949).
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Figure 3: Peak-load pricing with RES and non-RES.
the source is available. Assume there are two states of nature on the supply
side at each period : a state with plenty of primary energy (windy days)
with probability νt, and a state without any primary energy (days without
any wind). The staircase line in Figure 3 is the merit order in windy states
of nature when fossil-fuel capacity Kf and RES capacity Ki are available:
first, produce at 0 marginal cost up to Ki, then serve additional demand at
marginal cost cf up to Ki + Kf . In states of the world without wind, the
merit order is just shifted leftwards up to quantity Ki.
Ex post, if capacity Ki is installed on top of Kf , the market equilibrium
price at period t will be as follows:
• with probability νt, p
e
t = 0 off-peak, p
e
t = S
′
t (Ki) at periods of low
demand N∗i , pet = cf at periods of medium demand N∗i , and pet =
S
′
t (Ki +Kf ) at peak periods N
∗
if (see Figure 3);
• with probability (1− νt) , p
e
t = cf at periods of low demand and p
e
t =
S
′
t (Kf ) at periods of high demand N
∗
f .
Ex ante, given the expected electricity market prices and the unit cost
14
ri of production plants, the entry of RES is profitable if and only if

t∈ N∗i
νt
S
′
t (Ki)
(1 + ρ)t
+

t∈N∗i
νt
cf
(1 + ρ)t
+

t∈N∗
if
νt
S
′
t (Ki +Kf )
(1 + ρ)t
≥ ri (12)
Under pure market mechanisms, that is without any public intervention,
we see that profitability requires
• a low capital cost ri, a long life duration Ni, and large probabilities
νt;
• large operating cost cf in non-RES;
• small capacities of both types in order to push S
′
t (Ki) and S
′
t (Ki +Kf )
up.
Note that benefits are boosted by positive correlation between RES avail-
ability νt and marginal willingness to pay for electricity, i.e. in regions where
νt is large at dates t of large S
′
t (.). Clearly, windmill producers earn more
money if the wind blows in the day rather than at night and solar panel
owners would prefer the sun to shine at full capacity at the end of winter
working days.15
As for fossil-fuel plants,
• when a large quantity of RES is available, a positive margin only
appears at peak periods N∗if . In states
N∗i fossil fuel plants do not
produce and pt = cf in states N
∗
i .
• without RES, margins are positive at peak periods N∗f .
The profitability of fossil fuel plants then requires that

t∈N∗
f
(1− νt)
S
′
t (Kf )− cf
(1 + ρ)t
+

t∈N∗
if
νt
S
′
t (Ki +Kf )− cf
(1 + ρ)t
≥ rf (13)
15 In countries where peak demand is due to air conditioning, PV panel production is
positively correlated with demand.
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Under free entry, the long-run equilibrium capacities are those deter-
mined when (12) and (13) are equalities instead of inequalities. Given
the current values of parameters (cf , rf ,Nf , ri, Ni, ρ, {νt}) most renewables-
based technologies cannot be profitable when condition (13) is met as an
equality.16 Their cost ri is still too high, their availability {νt} to low and
their life Ni too short as compared to the characteristics of thermal plants
(cf , rf , Nf ). This explains why State aid is necessary for RES to reach prof-
itability. In the next section, we consider alternative policies aimed at mak-
ing RES profitable, even though we have seen in Section 2 that it should
not be an objective per se.
3.2 Certificates, tariffs, taxes and the like
Because of high cost, intermittency and geographical dispersion, Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) cannot be developed without government help. The
expected “grid parity”, that is the possibility for these energies to compete
against fossil sources on a level field is a matter of misunderstanding. It may
be true that in the future RES-electricity will have a MWh cost comparable
to the cost of fossil-fuel plants. That will however not solve the intermittency
feature since νt < 1 for most dates t. The guarantee to supply a given
quantity at a given date for a given duration will always be out of reach for
intermittent sources such as wind power and solar energy without additional
backup or storage equipment.17 Consequently, the development of RES-
electricity creates a public commitment to constrain the future industry
structure. The EU "Green 20" strategy actually authorizes Member States
to launch industrial policy in the energy sector.
In this mix of environmental and industrial policy, some Member States
use direct subsidies for investment, while others prefer quota obligations,
sometimes combined with tradable green certificates. However the most
16Even when cost parameters make RES competitive, long run equilibrium is feasible
only if consumers are reactive to scarcity at production nodes through state-contingent
prices. We address this point in the next section. For a detailed analysis of the case where
there is one single time period, see Ambec and Crampes (2012).
17On solar energy, see Baker et al. (2013); on wind power, Butler and Neuhoff (2008).
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widely used financial tool across the Community is a non-market system:
fixed feed-in tariffs (FIT) paid to green producers.
In the following paragraphs, I first show how RES are positively impacted
by an increase in the operating cost of electricity producers burning fossil
fuel. I then compare the effects of the tools currently used to promote RES.
3.2.1 Increasing the carbon cost
As shown in Section 2, the basic tool for environmental regulation should
consist in obliging producers who use polluting technologies to internalize
their negative externalities. This can be done by a tax equal to the marginal
environmental damage, by the obligation to buy the right to emit, or by free
allowances up to a given total quantity. The operating cost cf then becomes
cf + ∆, where ∆ stands for the tax, the fee to pay for acquiring rights or
the dual value of the quantitative constraint. As inequality (12) shows, by
increasing cf to cf +∆, the profitability condition is easier to meet for RES;
as (13) shows, it becomes more difficult for non-RES, so that some plants
are obliged to stop producing.
More precisely, a drastic CO2 policy indirectly benefits RES in two ways:
• enrichment effect: when demand is medium (t ∈ N∗i ) and the price
is determined by non-RES technologies, RES earn a larger margin
cf +∆− 0 (if they produce, i.e. with probability νt);
• replacement effect: the price at period t is lower when RES are
used than when they are not, regardless of whether t is a low or a
high demand period. This means that if fossil-fuel plants were just
balancing their budget before the entry of RES, it is no longer the
case afterwards. Then, to rebalance inequality (13), type-f firms are
obliged to decrease their installed capacityKf . Prices consequently de-
crease but remain high at peak periods because of the closure of type-f
plants, which is beneficial for RES, in particular if their production is
positively correlated with demand.
The replacement effect is a source of potential problems in terms of
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security of supply. Were RES just cheaper reliable sources of energy, the
entry of low-cost technologies pushing expensive ones out of the efficient mix
would be good news for consumers.18 Unfortunately, without smart meters
and appliances, electricity consumption is weakly responsive to short-term
scarcity signals such as price increases and warning messages sent by the
system operator.19 As a result, at each date t, consumers are not reactive
to the state of nature at production plant locations. Assume that ∆ is fixed
high enough for RES to be profitable. ThenKi > 0, but we know that qit = 0
with probability νt > 0 at period t. Unless we accept blackouts, electricity
being non-storable, production at period t must be the same whatever the
speed of wind at windfarm sites. For example at peak periods, we have
seen that pet should be equal to S
′
t (Kf ) with probability (1− νt) and to
S
′
t (Ki +Kf ) with probability νt. Actually, fossil fuel plants face two ex post
obligations: (a) to keep total production independent of the state of nature
and (b) to leave priority to RES in the efficient dispatch. Then, if RES
are very abundant, fossil-fuel plants must produce qift = 0 when RES are
available and qift = Ki when they are not, which requires the installation of
Kf = Ki.
More generally, denoting by pt the non state-dependent price at t
20 and
by Dt (pt) the corresponding demand, fossil fuel plants must be ready to
produce
qft =

Dt (pt)−Ki with probability νt
Dt (pt) with probability 1− νt
(14)
Assuming that fossil-fuel firms produce at full capacity at peak periods
without RES and that black-outs and brown-outs are not permitted, we
18 In Germany, at noon on July 21, 2013, solar production reached the total record of 24
GW, that is more or less the production of 24 nuclear plants. The two main incumbents,
RWE and E.ON, are contemplating the closure of some 15 GW of coal and gas-fired plants.
19With the exception of big industrial consumers who have contracts at low prices to
compensate for curtailment clauses. For smaller customers (small industrial and busi-
ness clients, households) service providers propose remotely controlled load-shedding (see
Crampes and Léautier, 2012).
20 In real life, because of the absence of smart meters, not only electricity prices cannot
depend on the state of nature, but it cannot even depend on date.
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have Kf = Dt (pt) or pt = S
′
t (Kf ) for t ∈ N
∗
f . We also have pt = S
′
t (Kf )
at peak periods with RES

t ∈ N∗if

because of the impossibility to have
state-contingent prices, but fossil fuel producers can only sell Dt (pt)−Ki.
The budget balancing conditions of the two types of producers are then
t
νt
pt
(1 + ρ)t
≥ ri (15)

t∈N∗
f
(1− νt)
pt − cf
(1 + ρ)t
+

t∈N∗
if
νt
pt − cf
(1 + ρ)t
Dt (pt)−Ki
Kf
≥ rf (16)
As shown in Ambec and Crampes (2012), when consumers are not reactive to
state-contingent prices, lower energy prices combined with the dramatic fall
in non-RES electricity sales due to RES priority results in the impossibility
to meet the separate conditions (15) and (16) simultaneously: a zero net
present value in (16) gives a strictly positive net profit to RES, and a zero
net present value in (15) provokes financial losses of non-RES plants. The
intuition is as follows: to satisfy (16) we need pt ≥ cf in all states of nature.
The RES producers then earn pt − 0 ≥ cf > 0 whenever they are active
while at first best where budgets are balanced, the price should be 0 during
off-peak periods where RES are available.
To reach a long-run equilibrium, it is necessary to implement structural
arrangements (mergers), contractual arrangements (guarantee of supply) or
portfolio obligations to balance the producers’ budget globally, i.e. to com-
pensate for the financial losses of fossil-fuel plants with the benefits of RES.
Besides back-up by thermal plants, RES intermittency can also be balanced
by demand curtailment, energy storage and imports.
3.2.2 Technology-pushed vs. demand-pulled entry
The above analysis with or without price-reactive consumers is based on
the possibility for RES to be competitive against non-RES, in particular
because of a high CO2 cost. In reality, RES are far from competitive, and
EU Member States are obliged to force the entry of technologies based on
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renewables into the energy mix by violating competition rules.21 In the
following paragraphs, we consider first subsidies to R&D in RES technologies
and second subsidies to electricity demand.
Subsidies to R&D When investors face a technology with
Ni
t=1
νt
ptqit
(1 + ρ)t
< riKi (17)
where pt is exogenous and qit ≤ Ki, they naturally consider whether the
inequality can be reversed by means of R&D investment that could increase
Ni and νt, and decrease ri. There are at least two advantages with the R&D
solution: (i) decision-makers can choose the best option within their tool-
box and (ii) they bear the risk of failure, which is the role of entrepreneurs
as they are less risk-averse than the other agents. There are also at least
two drawbacks: (i) because of economies of scale and learning by doing,
drastic improvement can be out of reach when many agents act separately
and (ii) R&D is a source of positive externalities that individual decision-
makers cannot easily internalize. Then, since reversing the inequality in
(17) is now a Community objective for RES, if joint ventures necessitate
excessive transaction costs or are impeded under Article 100 of the Treaty,
State aid becomes necessary. Given its distortive effects, State aid is lim-
ited by guidelines issued by EU authorities. In particular "State aid for
research, development and innovation in the environmental field is subject
to the rules set out in the Community framework for State aid for research
and development and innovation. However, the market diffusion stage of
eco-innovation (acquisition of an eco-innovation asset) is covered by these
Guidelines."22 In other words, upstream State aid aimed at reversing (17) for
21"State aid may be justified if the cost of production of renewable energy is higher than
the cost of production based on less environmentally friendly sources and if there is no
mandatory Community standard concerning the share of energy from renewable sources
for individual undertakings. The high cost of production of some types of renewable energy
does not allow undertakings to charge competitive prices on the market and thus creates
a market-access barrier for renewable energy." European Commission, 2008, §48.
22European Commission (2008), Paragraph 63.
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RES must follow the same rules defined in European Commission (2006)23
as for any innovation in any industry. That is good news for the economist
who considers there to be no reason to make the Green 20% strategy a sui
generis objective. It is bad news for the economist who observes that, given
that the Green 20% is now a sui generis objective, in the absence of any
upstream specific encouragement, Member States will systematically adopt
downstream State aid.
Premiums and Feed-in Tariffs Another way to change the sign in (17)
is to increase pt and qit, and decrease ρ.
A reduction in interest rates for loans dedicated to financing green in-
vestment is a simple solution, but given the high cost of these technologies, it
can be true that they remain unprofitable even when ρ = 0. Complementary
solutions are then necessary.
The quantity sold can systematically be increased up to the capacity
available by means of priority rules: the system operator must accept any
injection coming from RES before energy from plants using sources not on
the list mentioned by Directive 2009/28/EC.24 After capacities have been
installed, this is not a distortion of competition, given that RES generically
have an operating cost close to zero, below the operating cost of thermal
plants. Why it then appears as an obligation is unclear: it is actually ex post
efficient to include RES first in the merit order when available (see Figure
3). However, this obligation may be a source of inefficiency under specific
circumstances: at some hours, nuclear or coal-fueled plants have negative
economic costs due to starting, warming and ramping constraints; therefore,
at some hours, they should be ranked before RES that have a zero operating
cost in the merit order. This is forbidden, given the rule of priority to RES.
This can be illustrated as follows:
• there are two types of period: off-peak at night (n), and peak at day
(d);
23Note that this Framework is currently under review.
24Except for safety and technical reasons, in particular when lines are congested.
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• because of ramping-rate constraints, the unit cost of production at a
given hour depends on what the firm was doing during the preceding
hour. Specifically, to keep the model simple, the unit cost is c (0) at
night and c (qn) in the day, with c
′
(qn) < 0.
Then, for the firm that solves
max
qn,qd
Sn (qn)− c (0) qn + Sd (qd)− c (qn) qd
the first-order conditions are
S
′
n (q
∗
n)− c (0)− c
′
(q∗n) q
∗
d = 0 (18)
S
′
d (q
∗
d)− c (q
∗
n) = 0 (19)
During night hours, the economic cost of the thermal producer is c (0)+
c
′
(q∗n) q
∗
d. Since it is below c (0) , it gives producers the incentive to produce
off-peak more than if c
′
≡ 0. The welfare loss resulting from S
′
n (q
∗
n) < c (0)
is more than compensated at day thanks to the consecutive decrease from
c (0) to c (q∗n). The point is that if (i) the ramping effect
c′ is strong and (ii)
the expected daytime demand q∗d is high, the accounting cost at night c (0)
may be below the opportunity gain −c
′
(q∗n) q
∗
d so that c (0) + c
′
(q∗n) q
∗
d < 0.
This explains why electricity producers are allowed to submit negative bids
on wholesale markets.25 When they do so, they should be ranked first in
the merit order since bids from RES should, at the lowest, be equal to 0.
Actually, this efficient market mechanism is impaired by wind-mill operators
who also submit negative bids. We now explain that it results from the tariff
policy in favor of RES.
To change the inequality in (17), many Member States have chosen to
pay electricity producers using renewable sources a unit price αpt+Ft, where
pt is the market price, α a coefficient in [0, 1] and Ft > 0 a premium raised
25See for example the auctions organized for France, Germany/Austria and
Switzerland on www.epexspot.com/en/market-data/auction/curve/auction-aggregated-
curve/ and for the Netherlands and the UK on www.apxgroup.com/market-results/apx-
power-nl/aggregated-curves/
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from other agents of the industry (mainly consumers). In the extreme case
where α = 0, RES producers are totally disconnected from market signals.
France, Germany, Italy and Spain have hugely subsidized the solar and wind
energies by guaranteeing generous selling prices Ft (named feed-in tariffs,
FIT) for 20 years to the electricity producers equipped with windmills and
photovoltaic panels.26 These programs have been so successful that they
have endangered the financial equilibrium of the funding system in the four
countries obliging governments to downsize tariffs and redefine conditions
for eligibility. Meanwhile, FIT that reward producers using wind resources
have also impaired the efficiency of negative bids. If a windmill operator
anticipates a reward αpt + Ft per MWh when producing, any spot price
pt >
−Ft
α is still profitable since the operating cost is nil. The operator is
then encouraged to bid slightly above −Ftα , which can still be very low,
27
guaranteeing a positive margin on every MWh injected, even though the
equilibrium spot price is negative. In Germany, negative equilibrium prices
have almost always occurred in early-hour markets of low demand (1:00 am
− 2:00 am, 2:00 am − 3:00 am, etc.) where large quantities of wind energy
from the North Sea were available. Whether this can prevent thermal plants
from being dispatched at early hours and be operational at low cost when
the morning demand is at a peak cannot be taken into consideration by the
system operator under the current regulation.
Public authorities often emphasize several side benefits on top of limit-
ing global warming from the promotion of RES. They quote in particular
increasing energy security, leading Europe out of the economic crisis and
creating new technology jobs.28 All these side-effects are disputable, in par-
26 In other countries, α = 1 and Ft is a supplement reward from selling certificates
associated with RES production. Certificates are sold to obligated parties (suppliers in
Belgium and UK, producers in Italy, grid companies in Germany). The tradable green
certificate system looks like the EU ETS except that it is organized on a national basis. It
therefore has the same qualities and shortcomings as ETS, in particular the administrative
cost of registering and controlling.
27However, energy exchanges impose price floors: on Epexspot, bids cannot be below
€−3000 /MWh. See www.eex.com/de/document/74115/EEX_MARKET_MONITOR-
Q4_2009-english_final.pdf
28 In Directive 2009/28/EC Preamble 4 says: "When favouring the development of the
market for renewable energy sources, it is necessary to take into account the positive
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ticular the possibility to give European industries an advantage in the field
of PV panels. By relying on very generous FIT, Member States hoped that
consumers would massively buy PV panels so that, thanks to learning-by-
doing and economies of scale, the production cost of panels ri would go down
and change the direction of the inequality (17). This did occur, but gov-
ernments have forgotten that under this subsidization regime (i) consumers,
not manufacturers, are the risk-takers: they bear regulatory uncertainty, and
they can be stuck for 20 years with obsolete panels, and (ii) consumers be-
have like any electricity producer, choosing the least-cost equipment, which
is eventually imported from Asia. Indeed, high FIT have created a violent
shock of demand in the market where parts of green equipment are manu-
factured. The shock has excluded European champions from the equipment
market instead of giving them a boost.29 The industrial policy slice of the
promotion plan is then a total failure.
impact on regional and local development opportunities, export prospects, social cohesion
and employment opportunities, in particular as concerns SMEs and independent energy
producers."
In Preamble 6: "The move towards decentralized energy production has many benefits,
including the utilization of local energy sources, increased local security of energy supply,
shorter transport distances and reduced energy transmission losses. Such decentraliza-
tion also fosters community development and cohesion by providing income sources and
creating jobs locally."
Similarly, "Renewable energy is crucial to any move towards a low carbon economy. It
is also a key component of the EU energy strategy. The European industry leads global
renewable energy technology development. It employs 1.5 million people and by 2020
could employ a further 3 million. The promotion of renewable energy also develops a
diverse range of mostly indigenous energy resources."
29The mechanism behind the expected development of RES through demand subsidies is
based on a decrease in production cost thanks to learning-by-doing. Contrary to the logics
of subsidies to R&D where an increase in demand is due to lower prices resulting from
lower costs, in the FIT system demand is the driver of the cost decrease. Therefore, with
FIT, an increase in demand comes sooner than under the regime of R&D subsidies. This
system can have adverse effects for competition as "Learning-by-doing involves a form of
sunk cost. Production leading to a gain in experience, is the cost which is sunk. Learning
therefore manifests itself as an irreversibility in production possibilities" (Dasgupta and
Stiglitz, 1988). This implies that under FIT there is a potential for creating a natural
monopoly instead of promoting competition. See also Crampes and Lefouili (2013).
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4 Conclusions
Environmental policies commonly used in the European Union are an inef-
ficient mix of taxes, markets, subsidies, feed-in tariffs and capacity obliga-
tions. Their complexity is masking the priority that must be given to the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Theoretically, several tools are more
efficient than only one since they allow fine tuning. Fischer and Neuwell
(2008) show that the least-cost tool to reduce polluting emissions is a price
or tax or dual value on polluting emissions, not indirect tools.30 They also
insist that "an optimal portfolio of policies achieves emissions reductions
at a significantly lower cost than any single policy." This is true if several
market failures are identified and if the tools are well chosen and well bal-
anced. In practice, the risks of mistakes, lobbying and opportunism increase
very rapidly with the number of State aids, in particular when each target
is sustained by a directive making it mandatory.
My discussion has been based on the drawbacks of the 20% RES objec-
tive because the inefficiency of the policy tools aimed at curbing polluting
emissions by RES promotion is strong. I have simply mentioned the energy
efficiency target because its rationale is very similar.31 Energy efficiency
should be subordinated to the reduction of negative externalities, but it
sometimes increase emissions.32 Also note that energy saving is not the nat-
ural outcome of a competition policy that promotes price decreases. Actu-
ally, energy retail prices increase whereas wholesale prices decrease because
retail prices include the additional costs imposed by the environmental pol-
icy. But price increases are much higher than they should be, particularly
in Germany, because the authorities have accumulated mistakes in choosing
30 In a numerical application to the U.S. electricity sector, they find the following ranking
in terms of welfare loss: (1) emissions price, (2) emissions performance standard, (3) fossil
power tax, (4) renewables share requirement, (5) renewables subsidy, and (6) R&D subsidy.
31See European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (2012). On demand response,
see Torriti et al. (2010).
32 In France for example, one rule to reach the 20% energy saving target requires that
new buildings do not consume more than 50 kWh/m2 of primary energy. This constraint
eliminates electric boilers that store hot water at night by consuming electricity from
nuclear plants. They are now replaced by gas boilers, which means an increase in the
consumption of an energy that emits GHG.
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the mix of environmental tools.
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